Explore essential best practices for handling token expiration and refresh strategies in JWT and token-based authentication. Assess your understanding of secure token lifecycles, refresh token management, and common pitfalls in security testing for modern authentication systems.
Why is it recommended to use short-lived access tokens combined with refresh tokens in a JWT-based authentication system?
Explanation: Short-lived access tokens limit the window an attacker has if a token is compromised, thereby reducing risk. Refresh tokens allow users to obtain new access tokens without frequent logins, balancing security and usability. Long-lived tokens can increase risk because they provide attackers with prolonged access. Using only refresh tokens for authentication is insecure, as it isn't their intended use and may increase attack surface.
In a web application, which is the most secure way to store refresh tokens on the client side to minimize exposure to cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks?
Explanation: Storing refresh tokens in httpOnly, secure cookies helps protect them from JavaScript access and ensures they are only sent to trusted origins over HTTPS, significantly reducing XSS risk. LocalStorage is vulnerable to XSS attacks, while JavaScript variables do not persist across browser reloads and are still accessible by scripts. Embedding tokens in HTML exposes them directly to anyone with page access, making it very insecure.
What should a properly implemented API do when a client presents an expired JWT access token during an authenticated request?
Explanation: The correct response is to reject requests with expired tokens, signaling the client to use a refresh token for obtaining a new access token. Automatically extending the expiration is insecure and undermines token lifecycle management. Accepting requests based solely on a valid signature, disregarding expiration, exposes the system to replay attacks. Silently accepting expired tokens defeats the purpose of token expiration.
When implementing a refresh token mechanism, which strategy best supports the ability to revoke tokens if a user logs out or changes credentials?
Explanation: Backend tracking (such as a token allowlist or blacklist) allows the server to invalidate refresh tokens upon logout or credential changes, supporting secure revocation. Storing tokens only in memory loses control over persistence and fails on browser reloads. Non-expiring, uncontrolled tokens can't be revoked, introducing risk. Reissuing the same refresh token allows attackers prolonged access if one is ever stolen.
Why is rotating refresh tokens on every use a recommended practice for preventing replay attacks in JWT-based systems?
Explanation: Rotating refresh tokens on each use makes the previous token invalid, preventing attackers from using intercepted refresh tokens for re-authentication. Increasing token length does not address replay risks. Granting additional permissions on rotation is insecure and not standard. Reducing the number of tokens stored is unrelated to replay protection and could lower security if not managed carefully.