Assess your understanding of best practices and core concepts in implementing authorization within GraphQL APIs. This quiz covers key authorization methods, security rules, common mistakes, and effective patterns for securing your GraphQL endpoints.
Which statement best describes the difference between authorization and authentication in a GraphQL API?
Explanation: Authorization controls access to resources and actions after a user has been authenticated, ensuring only permitted users can perform specific operations. Authentication just proves the user's identity. The statement about deciding user roles and passwords confuses the two concepts. Logging in is authentication, not authorization. Updating the schema is unrelated to either concept.
Why might you want to implement field-level authorization in a GraphQL API?
Explanation: Field-level authorization lets you limit access to certain fields within a type, ensuring users can only see or change data they are allowed to. This is important for sensitive data. Field-level authorization does not inherently optimize network traffic, aid in database migrations, or control rate limiting, which are different concerns.
What is a common pattern for enforcing authorization in a GraphQL resolver function?
Explanation: Validating permissions as soon as the resolver starts avoids leaking data or performing unwanted actions. Running a mutation first could result in unauthorized changes. Automatically granting access is insecure. Relying solely on schema definitions misses runtime context crucial for authorization.
What does Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) enable in a GraphQL API?
Explanation: RBAC lets you assign roles to users and define which roles can access which resources or perform specific actions. Assigning API endpoints to HTTP methods is not related to RBAC. Syntax validation is a parser's job, not RBAC. Storing tokens in schemas is insecure and unnecessary.
How can custom directives help enforce authorization rules within a GraphQL API?
Explanation: Custom directives can annotate fields to signal that authorization logic should run when those fields are accessed. They do not create new endpoints or bypass authentication. Filtering introspection is unrelated to the purpose of directives.
Why is it important to perform authorization checks in GraphQL mutations?
Explanation: Mutations may allow changes to important data, so ensuring only authorized users can perform them is crucial. Mutations are not guaranteed to run before resolvers; queries can also return sensitive data, so that statement is inaccurate. Non-administrators may also use mutations, depending on permissions.
When a user makes an unauthorized request, what is the recommended behavior for a GraphQL API?
Explanation: Best practice is to send an informative error indicating a lack of authorization, while not revealing internal details. Returning the data violates security principles. Closing database connections is unnecessary and unrelated. Syntax errors are specific to query structure, not permissions.
What is the purpose of using middleware for authorization in a GraphQL API server?
Explanation: Middleware allows centralized permission checks before any resolver is run, improving security and maintainability. Formatting queries, patching schemas, or caching outputs do not relate to authorization controls.
What is a safe default approach for access control in a GraphQL API?
Explanation: A 'deny-by-default' stance ensures users can only access resources they are clearly granted, minimizing risks of accidental exposure. Allowing access by default is unsafe. Temporary grants and random assignments ignore best practices and lead to confusion or vulnerabilities.
How is the user’s authorization context typically passed and accessed in GraphQL resolver functions?
Explanation: The context object is designed to carry user information, tokens, and related authorization details needed during request handling. Fetching context per-field is inefficient. Embedding such information in type definitions is not scalable. Injecting data into query strings is insecure and incorrect.
What technique can help keep authorization logic scalable and maintainable in larger GraphQL APIs?
Explanation: Reusable helpers centralize authorization rules for consistency and easier changes across the codebase. Duplicating checks leads to errors and maintenance headaches. Skipping checks opens security holes. Embedding raw SQL in resolvers conflates concerns and is unsafe.
Why must authorization checks be performed both when initializing and during the lifetime of a subscription in GraphQL?
Explanation: Since a user's access level might change while a subscription is active, repeated authorization checks prevent unauthorized data exposure. Context objects are generally accessible. Not all subscriptions are for public data. The server does not guarantee automatic authentication for subscriptions.
What is a potential risk of exposing the entire schema through introspection in a GraphQL API with authorization controls?
Explanation: Introspection can disclose details about your schema, revealing internal models or fields that should be hidden. Encryption and bandwidth concerns are unrelated to introspection itself. Introspection does not cause resolver failures.
Which scenario best demonstrates owner-based authorization in a GraphQL API?
Explanation: Owner-based authorization limits access or actions to users who 'own' a resource, such as their own data. Allowing updates to any resource, disabling authentication, or giving admin to all are insecure and do not represent owner-based control.
How does the least privilege principle apply to designing authorization for a GraphQL API?
Explanation: The least privilege model is about restricting permissions to only those strictly needed, reducing risk. Granting all permissions, making everything anonymous, or not updating privilege levels violates security best practices.
What is a common mistake that can lead to authorization bypass vulnerabilities in GraphQL APIs?
Explanation: Omitting checks in resolvers leaves gaps through which attackers can access or modify data they should not. Strict input validation, clear type names, and concise unauthorized error messages are actually positive security practices and do not create bypass issues.